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Article 2

Race Indeed Above All: A Reply to
Professors Andrea Curcio, Carol Chomsky,
and Eileen Kaufman
Dan Subotnik
9 U. MASS. L. REV. 278
ABSTRACT
Dan Subotnik responds to Andrea Curcio, Carol Chomsky & Eileen Kaufman,
Testing, Diversity, and Merit: A Reply to Dan Subotnik and Others, 9 U. Mass. L.
Rev. 206 (2014).
AUTHOR
Dan Subotnik is Professor of Law at Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law
Center. He thanks Touro librarians Laura Ross, Stacy Posillico, and Isaac Samuels
and his chief editor, Rose Rosengard Subotnik. He also thanks Professors Curcio,
Chomsky, and Kaufman for engaging with him on this important issue.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I

“. . . law schools may have to redefine qualification and
merit in ways that are less racially harmful.” 1

n Does Testing = Race Discrimination?: Ricci, the Bar Exam, the
LSAT, and the Challenge to Learning,2 I charged a number of law
academics with treating race as “the axis on which the world should
turn.”3 I reached this conclusion through analysis of widespread
criticism over the last twenty years directed against tests such as the
bar exam and LSAT. Testing, critics have claimed, is not only an
invalid predictor of performance; it also creates unacceptable racial
disparities in crucial areas of social and economic life. Accordingly,
they urge, testing systems must be subverted. The latest such sally,
“Testing, Diversity, and Merit,” is included in this volume—and is
primarily directed at me.4 Having carefully listened to my detractors, I
proceed to affirm my original judgment.
The authors, Professors Andrea Curcio, Carol Chomsky, and
Eileen Kaufman (CCK, if I may), categorically deny holding that “race
comes first,”5 or its twin, “diversity above all.”6 These prominent
members of the Society of American Law Teachers (SALT) charge me
in turn with perpetuating both “a false dichotomy between the twin
goals of diversity and identifying qualified individuals,”7 and a system
where test scores correlate with family money and education.8

1

2

3
4

5
6
7

8

Kristen Holmquist, Marjorie Schultz, Shelden Zedeck & David Oppenheimer,
Measuring Merit: The Schultz-Zedeck Research on Law School Admissions, 63
J. LEGAL EDUC. 565, 575 (2014). The sentence begins: “To maintain an
equitable admissions system and to contribute to a racially diverse legal
profession . . . .” Id.
Dan Subotnik, Does Testing = Race Discrimination?: Ricci, the Bar Exam, the
LSAT, and the Challenge to Learning, 8 U. MASS L. REV 332 (2013).
Id. at 339.
Andrea Curcio, Carol Chomsky, and Eileen Kaufman, Testing, Diversity, and
Merit: A Response to Professor Subotnik (and others), 9 UMASS L. REV. 206
(2014).
Id. at 275; see id. at 208–09.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 209. The authors insist that they speak for themselves in their article, not
for SALT. Id. at 206.
Id. at 210.
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Insisting that they are not “anti-intellectual,”9 CCK allow that
universities and employers have the right to interrogate a student’s and
an employee’s ability to succeed through tests: “Achieving fair and
economically appropriate decision-making—not achieving racial
balance—is the goal, but racial balance in outcomes is reason enough
to explore the validity of the tests.”10 Citing Title VII, they go on to
explain that educational and commercial institutions are duty-bound to
ensure both that tests are valid, i.e. predictive, and that they do not
produce “unintentional” and unnecessary disparities.11
In this reply, I argue that CCK are deluding themselves—that, their
protests to the contrary, race for them is not secondary; it comes first. I
further argue that testing measures some-to-much of what it is
designed to measure, and that a modern technological society requires
these measurements. Tests are fair in the sense that they are objective
and are usually created by groups of highly trained people.12 These
groups of course have their own interests to protect, but the burden, I
will argue, should be on those who would discredit test utility, a
burden which, I hold, CCK have not met.
II. A RETURN TO RICCI
I begin with Ricci v. DeStefano, as do CCK.13 In short, Ricci
involved a test given for promotion in the New Haven Fire
Department. No African American candidate emerged among the top
ten scorers and thus, under prevailing rules, none was eligible for
promotion. At this point, New Haven threw out the test. According to
CCK, New Haven’s motive for annulling test results was, as
suggested, concern about validity—not to favor minority candidates.14
This would seem to suggest that test validity and absence of group
favoritism are distinct goals.
What is beyond dispute, however, is that New Haven would not
have annulled the test if the results had been racially balanced. Indeed,
9
10

11
12

13
14

Id. at 221–22.
Id. at 211 (emphasis added). It is not clear what CCK mean by “economically
appropriate.”
Id. at 216.
See, e.g., Stephen G. Sireci, The Most Frequently Unasked Questions About
Testing, in DEFENDING STANDARDIZED TESTING 111, 111–12 (Richard P. Phelps
ed. 2005).
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
See Curcio, supra note 4, at 219.
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in a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court forced the City to
promote the successful firefighters under Title VII on the grounds that
the City had made its decision to annul the test “because of race.”15 In
arguing that New Haven should start its assessment over because of
attendant racial disparities in scores, are CCK holding race above all?
CCK say no, supporting the position of the Ricci minority.16 For
them a review of the test results was most likely mandated under Title
VII by the resulting racial disparities; these results alerted New Haven
that there might well be a problem with offending disparities.17 Such a
notion, however, hardly refutes the charge that for CCK race comes
first. If statistical disparity based on race is suggestive of invalidity,
and if, as previously suggested, New Haven would not have offered
another test but for the disparity, then racial balance would seem
highly probative of validity.
To this argument, CCK respond that invalidity can be established
without reference to race. They argue, citing the Ricci dissent, that
“command presence” is key for fire supervisors.18 Other jurisdictions,
CCK claim, accordingly gave lower weight to tests and higher value to
job assessments featuring simulations of real job conditions. But here
again race rears its head. For CCK, evidence that these assessment
measures were no less valid lies largely in the fact that in such
jurisdictions a greater number of racial minorities succeeded in their
efforts at promotion.19 Validity again means minority candidate
success.
To show that they were not merely reproducing a tautology, i.e.,
that they were not ignoring test validity in the normal sense of the
word, CCK advert to the fact that the tests in these other jurisdictions
had been vetted by testing professionals.20 But this is hardly
convincing. The test given by New Haven had also been approved by
professional industrial organization experts. These folks, moreover,
went out of their way to create a test that took into account “minority
firefighter styles.”21

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 580.
See Curcio, supra note 4, at 215.
See id. at 215–16.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 219–20.
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 565 (2009).
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This brings us to the practical consequences to municipalities if the
law had required New Haven to repudiate the test. Using a simple
cost-benefit analysis, municipalities would be obliged to scrutinize
personnel tests to make sure that racial disparities did not lead to the
attendant expense, embarrassment, and political cost of retesting.
Since that is far from easy, reasonable prudence would further induce
municipalities to develop tests and scoring systems in the first place
that would assure minority success. In short, if CCK have their way,
racial balance would be promoted at the expense of validity. Race
above all?
Affirmative action supporters may well see nothing wrong with
this. In one sense, they are right; what kind of person would fail to
celebrate the closing of employment and other racial gaps? But, it will
be recalled at this point, racial balance, or “diversity above all,” is just
what CCK repudiate as their goal.22
III. TESTING AND RACE
Ricci was of interest to me not because I thought one screening
device was better or fairer than another, but because New Haven
attempted to pull the rug out from under the white firefighters, who
had no notice of the racial component in the test for promotion. I
mostly used Ricci, as do CCK, as a lever to raise issues relating to
more broad-based tests such as the bar examination, the LSAT, and
testing in math and science. Before turning to these matters, a few
general observations. First, I do not argue here that testing as we know
it should be the touchstone for admissions and hiring. Tests will
always exclude some who might well make the grade in school or on
the job, often because they bring with them aspirations or traits that are
not tested. On the other hand, for those working at non-menial jobs,
job knowledge is essential. This being the case, high test scores can be
valuable.
Understandably, those who do not succeed on tests will attempt to
undermine them with all the tools at their disposal. Because tests can
always be adjusted, disparities for the test disadvantaged will be
avoidable. But the inevitable resistance to tests does not mean that they
should be abandoned. We cannot do without them in contemporary
life; indeed, we need to capture the hard-to-identify-and-evaluate-

22

See supra notes 5, 6, and accompanying text.
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talents of our students.23 For all talk to the contrary, however, these
exist only in experimental states and have not been developed in the
area of greatest concern to this paper: lawyering.
Second, as I have noted throughout my years in the legal academy,
race is so central to the sense of self in America—race elicits so much
insecurity and guilt—that loose talk pervades the legal discourse. As a
result, more than the normal amount of scholarly skepticism is
required in this area. Consider CCK’s charge about the tie between test
performance and family wealth and education.24 Granting this
unfortunate connection, as we must, should those without economic
advantages not be asked to compete head-on with their more fortunate
brethren? CCK never answer this question, much less consider the
implications.
Consider also what is left unaddressed by CCK in the following
passage about test results: “[Q]uestioning [disparities] is entirely
appropriate, especially if it results in better tests as well as more
diverse—and more fair—outcomes.”25 The passage raises obvious
questions; Fair to whom? The public? Firefighters generally? Minority
firefighters? Again, CCK do not say.
The point is, to put the matter candidly, that “more diverse” and
“more fair” outcomes, in the results-oriented sense that CCK use the
latter term, will often point in a different direction than “better tests.”
This is both because groups are not per se less diverse—i.e., more
identical—than are individuals and because testing cannot serve two
masters equally. Diversity and excellence may not be mutually
exclusive; but they are not synonymous either. CCK would have
considerably strengthened their article if they had dealt explicitly with
this inescapable and important matter.
A. The Bar Exam
Turning to the bar exam, CCK sound a message with a familiar
ringtone: the famous gateway exam to the profession fails to “address
whether there are viable, and better, ways to test for lawyering
skills . . . without a disparate racial impact.” 26 The bar exam is
premised on the simple idea that not everyone can be lawyer; those
23

24
25
26

See John D. Mayer, We Need More Tests, Not Fewer, N.Y. TIMES (March 11,
2014), at A21.
See supra note 8, and accompanying text.
See Curcio, supra note 4, at 211.
Id. at 224. CCK cite a bar committee study which complained of serious racial
disparities. Id. at 228.
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would seek to represent others first need to show minimum
competency to practice law on their own.27 Only the most hardened
public choice theorist, it would seem, believes otherwise.28
To support their challenge to the bar exam, CCK refer to series of
studies by the New York bar beginning in 1992 to evaluate the bar
exam for its validity and for the racial disparities it was producing.
These efforts resulted in reports that complained variously of the
exam’s emphasis on “speededness,” multiple choice questions,
memorization, multiple test subjects, and the exam’s correlative lack
of concern with lawyerly skills.29 I discuss each of these points
separately. As a preliminary matter, suffice to say that the bar
examiners have been at it a long time and get lots of help from the bar.
They are also a diverse group, racially and otherwise.30
Regarding exam time-sensitivity, CCK charge me with suggesting,
“without any empirical basis, that test taking speed is related to lawyer
efficiency.”31 I do not know how to prove the point to CCK’s
satisfaction. I took the matter mostly as self-evident, since lawyers are
asked to read fast and well on the job. It might be helpful to recall the
old saw that a “lawyer’s time and advice are his stock in trade.”32 The
27

28

29
30

See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS, http://www.pabarexam
.org/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2014). The purpose of the bar exam is to ensure that
exam takers have the “minimum competency necessary to become members of
the bar.” Id.
Public choice economics is premised on the idea that all too often government
engages in conspiracies with vested interests to help the latter receive “rents,”
i.e., undeserved windfalls. See generally PATRICK A. MCNUTT, THE ECONOMICS
OF PUBLIC CHOICE 223–27 (2nd ed. 1996).
See Curcio, supra note 4, at 230–40.
See MBE FAQ, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex
.org/about-ncbe-exams/mbe/mbe-faq/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
The National Conference of Bar Examiners is committed to gender
and ethnic diversity on all its drafting and policy committees. Each
drafting committee is composed of members of both sexes, and
members of ethnic minority groups participate in the preparation
and review of items both at the drafting committee level and at the
MBE policy committee level.

31
32

Id.
See Curcio, supra note 4, at 238.
Shapiro, THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 466 (Yale University Press, 2006).
This quote is apocryphally attributed to Abraham Lincoln. See, e.g., George B.
Shepard & Morgan Cloud, Time and Money: Discovery Leads to Hourly Billing,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 149 n. 224.
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lawyer’s time must thus be used well, a matter that bar examiners
surely understand. This is not to say that bar tests of “speededness”
have it right. Experiments in this area might prove useful. On the other
hand, estimates reported by CCK that an exam that doubled the
allotted time would increase bar exam scores by thirty points33 are not
necessarily relevant, especially if such a change inspired related
increases in scores of all bar takers. Competitiveness in efficiency
would seem to be relevant to employers.
Multiple choice questions obviously cannot not be defended as
representative of the work lawyers do. On the other hand, as CCK
themselves point out, a report commissioned by the NY Court of
Appeals and charged with considering race and gender performance
concluded that the bar exam, with its multiple choice questions, did
validly test generalized legal knowledge as it set out to do.34 In doing
so, it would seem to serve a valuable function. Perhaps more
important, no evidence supports the conclusion that scores on multiple
choice questions measurably differ from those on essay writing.
Lawyers have to be able to write. Under these circumstances, a racebased objection to multiple choice questions cannot be sustained.
As for the “memorization” matter, the thought presumably is that
in the computer age the law can always be looked up. But requiring
immediate control of some subject matter, to know some things
“cold,” cannot be dismissed as excessive. To illustrate—and at the risk
of sounding lame— contracts lawyers must incorporate the doctrine of
consideration in their bones or they might not know what to look for in
a contract formation matter. CCK might well characterize this not as
memorization but only understanding. The label hardly matters. In my
primary teaching domain, tax, one has to know what an expense is. A
lawyer who has to look that up is useless.
The claim that lawyers do not need, and proceed to forget, material
outside their area of specialization implies that the bar exam tests too
many subjects. But if the exam focused on one or two subjects, on
what basis would candidates be able to apply for jobs in different
fields of law? Moreover, analytical skills and practical solutions
learned in one specialized area are often transferrable to another. Legal
problems do not come in topically discrete containers. Finally, it is
hard to imagine that testing in one area would produce a distribution

33
34

See Curcio, supra note 4, at 238–39.
See id. at 227.
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that was any different from the current one encompassing many areas.
If CCK think otherwise, they should say so.
But there is something more fundamental here. Passing the bar
proves that you can learn and digest a mass of information. It may well
not matter whether that material is ever used, whether it sits on the
back burner of the mind, or whether it is soon forgotten. Whether or
not you have to know something to begin a practice, controlling a
large swath of disparate material would seem to be essential to success
in the practice of law as in any other profession.
I will address proposed alternatives to the bar exam below. For
now, a return to a simple question: Do CCK really want a screening
device for the bar? 35 Or is it again racial balance that they seek?
I commented in my earlier piece about the irony served up when
academics in a “learned profession” bash tests of knowledge.36 In a
“knowledge economy” and an “information age,” no less. But there is
no paradox here for CCK. Academic knowledge is one thing; work
knowledge another.
But here again, there is reason to doubt CCK’s understanding of
their own motives. Indeed, CCK readily acknowledge that African
Americans do not do well on the bar, referring to a “quite large” racial
gap in New York several years ago. Based on a passing score of 660 a
few years back, the pass rate in New York for Caucasian/whites was
88% while for Black/African Americans it was 58%.37
It simply cannot be the construction of the bar exam that is at fault
for failing to show what students can do. On all kinds of evaluations,
starting in the earliest years of childhood and continuing through
adulthood, CCK admit, African Americans lag behind their
counterparts.38 Gaps may be greatest of all in law schools.39 CCK
identify possible causes of these gaps, but they are no more able to
evaluate them than to explain why bar exam tests do not measure
knowledge necessary for lawyers.
One thing, however, is apparent. Lack of competitiveness is a
tragedy in contemporary America. For all the research, for all the
effort and money this country has invested, we have not learned how
to properly educate our black youth. The point here is that it would be
35
36
37
38
39

See id. at 249.
Subotnik, supra note 2, at 395.
See Curcio, supra note 4, at 225 n. 84.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 263.
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miraculous at this time if our black young people as a group were
competitive on tests of knowledge that bar examiners would choose to
give. This being the case, if they are to hold black and white students
as equally prepared for law school, CCK must try to define bar exam
validity in terms other than that of knowledge. Hence the opening
epigraph.
Assisting in this effort is the attack on law school grades.40 CCK
must play down grades because they correlate with bar passage.41 In
this attack, CCK are least convincing. The evidence they present is
essentially limited to a study of a large New York law firm that found
that law school grades did not tie to success at the firm except for
those at the very top of their classes.42 But if, as is likely, the firm
could restrict hires to those from the top of the class through high
salaries, a restriction of range problem would render this study
meaningless.
If grades are not important, what is? It is not just that tests of
knowledge are invalid. It is that knowledge itself is overrated. Success
at work is founded on “[C]reativity, the ability to work well in teams,
listening skills, common sense, and good judgment.”43 CCK are
undoubtedly right in the high value they attach to these factors and I
will come back to this arguement. But if CCK really believed that
grades do not matter, we could expect them to address the issue of
grades on a broader scale. Concern about grades after all drives many
students to distraction and requires administrators to provide costly
mental health services.44
More important, If students are actually deficient in emotional and
interpersonal competence, or if studying Title VII, antitrust, and
privacy law provides an insufficient professional payoff for them, law
schools should be hiring educational psychologists and expanding the
curriculum. Warehouses full self-help books and DVDs could be
mined to enhance student creativity and relationships with co-workers,
superiors, subordinates, and especially clients.

40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 239.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 240.
We should all agree that law school would be sweeter and healthier if students
were told explicitly that grades are just a vestige of a corrupt hierarchical system
and that they should be taking take their nights off.
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One should not suppose that training in these areas would be
déclassé for even a top graduate school. The University of Chicago
Graduate School of Business, for example, requires all students to take
Leadership Effectiveness and Development, a course that highlights
negotiation, team building, and giving feedback.45
Consistent with their stated goal of testing merit, CCK do not
suggest that law graduates be automatically licensed to practice law, a
state of affairs that exists in Wisconsin for those who do their legal
study in the State and remain there to work.46 They propose as
alternatives to current bar exams a range of programs that test
“MacCrate” skills rather than doctrine, pointing as a model to the
Daniel Webster Scholars Honors Program at the University of New
Hampshire School of Law.47 Upon completion of one year at UNH,
those accepted into the program move to special educational
environments in which MacCrate skills are highlighted and students
are monitored by faculty and members of the New Hampshire Board
of Law Examiners. Upon successful completion of the program,
students can be admitted into the New Hampshire bar without having
to take the bar exam.
There is much to be said for teaching legal skills and then testing
for them. How much, however, can such testing in these conditions
accomplish? UNH Law School only accepts only one-third of its
approximately seventy-five students per class into the program, and
these students follow a prescribed curriculum and must maintain a B
average to graduate.48 Admittees, in other words, have either already
shown or could be expected to develop the requisite knowledge; they
would most likely pass the regular bar exam. Thus the Program would
not satisfy CCK’s objectives of producing lawyers who would
otherwise be screened out. Beyond that problem, it is hard to see how

45

46
47
48

See Leadership, Effectiveness, and Development (LEAD), THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO BOOTH SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, http://www.chicagobooth.edu/programs
/full-time/academics/lead (last visited Sept. 4, 2014). The University of Chicago
Business School has entire concentrations of relevance to us here, e.g.,
marketing management, general management, and managerial and
organizational behavior. Id.
See WIS. STAT. § 757.28 (2012).
Id. at 245–46.
Telephone Interview with Professor John B. Garvey, Director of the Daniel
Webster Scholar Honor’s Program, University of New Hampshire School of
Law (Apr. 22, 2014).
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this could play out in New York State when 15,000 candidates seek
admission to the bar at the same time.
An alternative plan proposed by CCK would be to give students
credit for public service or clinic experience, and there is something to
be said for this as well.49 But here too, in addition to the impossibility
of objective measurement and all the issues of fairness that that would
raise, there is the problem of candidate doctrinal knowledge. For
reasons previously mentioned, that cannot simply be wished away.
B. The LSAT
Just as CCK deem legal knowledge as measured by bar exam
scores largely irrelevant for assessing readiness for professional
practice, so too do they hold cognitive testing on the LSAT to be
irrelevant for measuring capacity to function as a lawyer. The LSAT,
CCK admit, is useful in predicting first-year grades in doctrinal
courses because it tests the same “narrow range of analytical skills
using multiple choice and essay or short answer questions
administered under time pressure.”50 But it fails to “fully predict
academic performance”51 and it does not test “practical judgment” and
“communication,”52 required for the job. Aggravating the problem
with the LSAT is the malevolent influence of US News & World
Report.53
Since a measure that can “fully predict” anything in our world
would seem hard to come by, rejecting the LSAT on this basis makes
little sense. Law schools can try to screen for students with “practical
judgment,” but how to find this elusive quality? As for communication
skills, the LSAT already requires candidates to write a coherent and
persuasive essay.54
This suggests that the real concern raised by the LSAT lies
elsewhere. If measurement is important for educational institutions, if
the LSAT is designed to help students avoid enormous expense and
49
50
51

52
53
54

See Curcio, supra note 4, at pp. 249–52.
Id. at 254.
See id. The test reportedly does not correlate with grades in legal research and
writing.
See id. at 264.
Id. at 258–59.
The bar exam already requires an essay. See, e.g., Bar Admissions Basic
Overview, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, (last visited Sept. 9, 2014) http://www
.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/bar_admissions/basic_overv
iew.html.
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frustration when their chances of success are limited, it would seem
that it is the racial disparities again that are at issue. The sad reality is
that the mean African American LSAT score of 143 is ten points lower
than the average white score, 153.55
That law schools overvalue the LSAT will find no support here.
But in order to seriously limit use of that test, it would seem, critics
must show one of two things: either that law school grades do not
measure anything useful, or that there are good alternatives or
supplements to the LSAT.
As for grades, we need more evidence from CCK than they
provide. If first-year grades have no significance, one would expect
that, as was discussed in relation to the bar exam, CCK would be
urging law schools to move to pass-fail systems or perhaps to abolish
final exams. That CCK do not go this far should lead readers to be
skeptical. The other problem with CCK’s critique is the absence of real
alternatives to the LSAT. Without these, we cannot know what
significance to give to racial disparities.56
To be sure, discussing aptitude testing, CCK tell us about
efforts to measure the “multiple aspects of intelligence,” citing the
work among others of Robert Steinberg whose test reportedly has
“twice the practical predictive power” of the SAT alone on scholastic
performance.57 But they do not tell us whether this test is appropriate
for law schools.
CCK report more fully on the work of Marjorie Shultz and
Sheldon Zedeck.58 After years of research with scores of practitioners,
these two researchers found 26 “effectiveness” factors59 and developed
tests for their measurement. The good news, CCK report, is that there
are few racial subgroup differences. But CCK do not show us Shultz
and Zedeck’s tests, or samples thereof. CCK admit, moreover, that this
work, along with Steinberg’s, is “developing, not definitive.”60 Under
55

56
57
58

59
60

See Law School Admissions Council, LSAT Technical Report 12-03, at 19 (Oct.
2012).
See Curcio, supra note 4, at 260–62.
See id at 260.
See Marjore M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness:
Broadening the Basis for Law School Admission Decisions, 36 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 620 (2011).
Id. at 630.
See Curcio, supra note 4, at 262–63. Holmquist et al. suggest that, although
requiring much more validation work, the test is available now. See Holmquist,
Schultz, Zedeck & Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 382.
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the circumstances, it is hard to know what rational observers are
supposed to do except to continue with the current system.
C. The Workplace
In the last section of their article, CCK extend their case against
the bar exam to the workplace. This environment they argue requires
employees to “recognize problems that are ill defined, require
information-seeking, may have multiple acceptable solutions, may
require information learned in everyday experience, and potentially
require motivation and personal involvement, a different set of skills
than those involved in solving academic problems.”61
The implication is that learning in school is a dead end, i.e., its
utility ends at the threshold of the workplace. Easy to say; but is it so?
My point: academic training makes it more likely, not less likely, that
well-educated students will come up with “multiple acceptable
solutions.” Learning, moreover, requires motivation and curiosity
about the world. To the extent that CCK distance the relationship
between school and the job, they themselves are creating a false
dichotomy.62
Work, for CCK, correlates not so much with cognitive skills but
with “conscientiousness, extraversion, emotional stability, agreeableness, and openness to experience.”63 These factors are important,
to be sure. Doing well in school, however, evidences
conscientiousness. A curriculum vitae will show personal involvement
in the form of organizational leadership both in school and outside of
it. It will also demonstrate a thirst for experience. But surely it cannot
be assumed from the absence of good grades that students are doing
something interesting and productive; students have to show it. Even
where a student can show a successful internship at a not-for-profit
during law school, CCK provide no help in assessing how that should
play out in law firm hiring.
We come to what seems the most important ingredient for success
at work for CCK—at least they tout it more highly than any other
element, including knowledge: race itself, i.e., diversity. Hiring racial
minorities, say CCK, will help companies serve an “increasingly
diverse customer base.”64 Indeed, “[t]he market arguments in favor of
61
62
63
64

See Curcio, supra note 4, at 262–63.
Id.
Id. at 270–71.
Id at 268 (citing Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of
Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. L. REV. 367, 424–27 (2008)).
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diversity are compelling.”65 Diversity is perhaps most important in the
legal profession and judiciary. A diverse workplace brings different
“life experiences,” “linguistic and cultural skills, knowledge of
international markets,” and it “strengthens the rule of law.”66 The trick
is to liberate ourselves from the oppressive burden of tests so as to
give appropriate effect to diversity. Whatever the diversity payoff to
individual employers or to the larger society, we are back to the
bottom-line question: race above all?
One matter remains. Admittedly, much of the previous discussion,
on both sides, has been based on conjecture. Which kind of screening
test is more valid for promotion in the fire department? Do lawyers
with high LSAT and bar exam scores perform better than others?
Could those who do not pass the bar exam perform sufficiently well.
In sum, are tests just crapshoots?
While CCK provide no empirical evidence of the economic
contribution of diversity, I did provide such evidence on the value of
cognitive skills and knowledge that current tests measure. I cited a
study by a major economic player in the world, the Organization of
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), of the results on
science and math tests (PISA scores) administered to 15 year-olds in
mostly developed countries around the world. American students
emerged in the middle of the pack. Most important, researchers found
that math and science scores, which were also tied to reading scores,
correlated with GDP growth rates. The study ended up estimating that
if the US had been at the top in test scores, the present value of the
economic growth would be over $100 trillion.
CCK are not persuaded. Even if GDP and exam scores correlate
with one another, they conclude, “it is hard to prove that higher
cognitive skill levels produce higher GDP.”67 They cite a study
showing that other factors such as trade policy and the number of R &
65
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67

Id. Do CCK really mean this? If market arguments for diversity are so
compelling, why the need for affirmative action on the job? If the answer is
racial discrimination, it would seem that the charge should be explicit. Since it is
not and since minorities are under-represented in higher level positions, one
might hypothesize, contrariwise, that for CCK it is nondiscrimination laws that
stand in the way of minority hiring. For what it is worth, a University of
California sociology professor thinks so. See JOHN D. SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL
RIGHTS: RACIAL REALISM IN THE NEW AMERICAN WORKPLACE 35–37 (2014).
See Curcio, supra note 4, at 268 (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION: THE NEXT STEPS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 9–10 (2010)).
Id. at 268–69 (emphasis added).
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D researchers are no less important to GDP growth. This is not the
place for a full evaluation of the OECD study. Nor, perhaps, do we
need one. CCK insist that they hold to the “highest educational
standards”68 but conclude that “it is a mistake to over-emphasize the
value of standardized cognitive tests in considering how to improve
GDP just as it is a mistake to look only at cognitive test results to
determine who is likely to succeed in school and on the job.”69
Is this CCK’s real point? If I am right here, CCK are far more
interested in racial balance than in anything else.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is hard to understand how, believing that tests predict so little,
academics can be central players in a system where tests of knowledge
play so large a part. I will not even attempt to do so. I will, however,
try to answer questions more closely related to CCK’s article: Why do
McKinsey, Bain Capital and Goldman Sachs ask for SAT scores of job
applicants?70 How to understand the fierceness with which CCK deny
both seeking racial balance and “undermining the case for the highest
intellectual standards,” on the one hand, while, on the other,
suggesting that minority status is a key predictor of success in the
marketplace.
Knowledge and learning ability count. Nowhere in their sixtypage article, however, do CCK say anything recognizing that, for
historical, cultural, or discriminatory reasons, there are real differences
in academic preparation among racial groups and that tests reflect
these gaps. For CCK, preparation must be equal across racial lines a
priori. That being the case, race can be used to determine academic
and employment opportunity.
Like so many others, it would appear, CCK are so discomfited by
racial gaps in testing that they will do anything to avoid recognizing
their true significance. This must have a profound effect on
contemporary discourse and understanding. Sweeping away these
differences, takes eyes off the ball. Downplaying the importance of
grades, as CCK do in their article, has the same effect. If tests proved
to be valid, as CCK themselves admit, the solution for minorities
68
69
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Id. at 269.
Id.
Shaila Dewan, How Businesses Use Your SATs, N.Y. Times (March 29, 2014),
at SR4. Dewan reports that researchers are finding that other tests, such as
Advanced Placement exams, are even better predictors that the SAT. Id.
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might be “remedial work to improve performance on the test.”71 That
is to say, it is the reputed invalidity of tests that allows CCK to ignore
racial differences—and the needed educational effort.
Denying real racial differences has a negative effect on nonminorities as well. Because of its perceived false foundations, because
of the unimaginability that CCK teach their children and students that
test scores and grades are unimportant, a climate of general distrust of
racial discourse is created. This undermines majority support for
affirmative action and educational enrichment. If there are no real
knowledge differences between blacks and whites, if they are indeed
competitive with one another, wherein lie the disadvantages—as in
“disadvantaged minorities”— that should be at the heart of affirmative
action?
Getting minorities into the center of the educational mainstream is
essential for our country. Holding that everything should turn on race
subverts this purpose, again, by distracting our attention from what
needs to be done; holding this position and denying it is worse. An
open and honest discussion in which merit is not definitionally
conflated with diversity—a discussion in which the need for legal
services can be carefully weighed against loosening requirements for
admission into the legal profession—is called for. Only by allowing
comparison of the intellectual aspects of the law with those, say, of
medicine, can we have a chance to figure out what lawyers can and
should know. Only where we can accept that racial differences in test
scores are danger signs, not presumptive civil rights violations, will we
maximize our chance at progress and peace.72

71
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Id. at 58.
Several hours before I turned this article in, I learned from Professor Lani
Guinier at a Law and Society meeting that she has finished a new book, THE
TYRANNY OF MERITOCRACY (forthcoming Jan. 2015). Readers interested in my
piece will surely want to get her take.

